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1. Introduction
1.1 Two Dogmas of Reductionism
Two persistent tendencies have made themselves felt in the course of philosophical
history. On the one hand is the Ockhamite tendency, the tendency to embrace one or
other of a small repertoire of simplified ontologies, for example atomism or monism,
together with a view according to which more complicated entities are to be ‘reduced’ by
one or other means to the favoured class of simples. On the other hand is Cartesianism,
the tendency to embrace one or other foundationalist doctrine in epistemology, or in other
words to prize episteme at the expense of doxa. The two tendencies reinforce each other
mutually. Thus foundationalism tilts the attention of philosophers in the direction of
ontological simples, for it is held that in relation to the latter knowledge secure against
doubt is more easily attainable. Philosophers are thus shielded from any concern with the
complex mesoscopic (medium-sized, middle-range, human-scale) objects of our everyday
environment and of the social world, since the latter is, after all, a realm of mere opinion,
not worthy of the attention of those striving after rigour.
    Austrian philosophers have been marked no less than philosophers in other traditions 
by both of these tendencies. Brentano, especially, was an avowed foundationalist, a 
proponent of psychological immanentism, and in his later philosophizing he embraced an 
ontology according to which all objects must belong to the single category of thing or 
substance. Husserl, similarly, argued that if knowledge of objects is to be possible at all, 
then objects and knowing subjects must be made, in the end, of the same (mind) stuff. 
Mach, familiarly, embraced an atomistic (‘neutral’) monism of ‘elements’, and both he 
and Brentano are strongly influenced by the sceptical legacy of corpuscularism which led 
them to conceive the common-sense world – of tables and beer, weddings and battles, 
orchestras and armies – as a chimera, a product of Falschnehmung or of the lazy 
workings of the ‘economy of thought’. Both have serious difficulties in comprehending 
holistic structures – and it is in this respect noteworthy that the Gestalt movement, 
initiated by Christian von Ehrenfels with his classic paper “On ‘Gestalt-Qualities’” of 
1890, began as an attempt to craft out of Mach’s and Brentano’s theories of sensation a 
workable account of our perception of melodies and of other complex objects of 
experience.  
1.2 The Psychological Environment  
Our topic here is social wholes, including very complex social wholes such as the 
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Sovereign Military Hospitaler Order of St. John, the War of the Spanish Succession, the 
O. J. Simpson trial. Austrian philosophers such as Mach, Wittgenstein, and Gustav 
Bergmann, who sought to reconstruct the world out of simples – simple sense-data, 
simple substances, bare particulars, basic universal properties – via a gluing together of 
objectives, facts, sets, classes, circumstances, actualities, possibilities, and what one will 
– were doomed to fail in the attempt to nail down theoretically the sort of integrity that 
such wholes represent, since the wholes in question are not the results of any logical (or 
physical, or psychological) compounding. But they are real nonetheless, or so I shall 
argue. The tradition of philosophizing inspired by Brentano, in contrast, included a 
number of holistically inclined thinkers not wedded to logical or ontological 
reductionism, and the present essay is in part a tale of the gradual rediscovery of social 
objects, and of common-sense objects in general (complex objects in the realm of non-
apodictic experience), by philosophers in the wake of Brentano, Ehrenfels and Husserl. 
Ehrenfels’ confrontation with the problem of complex wholes was continued by Meinong 
and his student Fritz Heider, by Ehrenfels’ student Max Wertheimer, by Bühler and 
Brunswik in Vienna, and then by the great Gestalt theorists who gathered around Carl 
Stumpf in Berlin, including not only Wertheimer but also Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Koffka, 
and Kurt Lewin. On becoming transplanted to America, Heider, Koffka and Lewin in 
their turn influenced the ecological psychologists J. J. Gibson and Roger Barker,(2) and it 
is in the works of the latter that the beginnings of a correct framework for the ontology 
social objects are finally to be found.  
    In light of the then still forceful influence of atomistic and immanentistic philosophies, 
Stumpf, the early Husserl, Meinong and their contemporaries had seen their task as being 
that of explaining how the appearance of complexity can arise on the basis of mental 
simples. The external environment of the psychological subject is for these philosophers 
a matter of mere construction. The later Gestaltists turned their attentions more resolutely 
out into the world, which they understood also in physical terms and in terms which 
recognized a genuine, autonomous complexity of structure on the side of physical reality. 
When moving to consider the environment of human behaviour and perception, however, 
they fell victim to a view according to which this ‘behavioural’ or ‘psychological 
environment’ would exist as a mere aspect of a relational whole encompassing also the 
behaviour by which it is formed.  
    To see the problem at issue it will be useful to quote the passage from Koffka in which 
the Gestaltist distinction between the ‘behavioural’ (or mental) and ‘geographic’ (or 
physical) environments is introduced:  
   
On a winter evening amidst a driving snowstorm a man on horseback arrived at an inn, 
happy to have reached shelter after hours of riding over the wind-swept plain on which 
the blanket of snow had covered all paths and landmarks. The landlord who came to the 
door viewed the stranger with surprise and asked him whence he came. The man pointed 
in the direction straight away from the inn, whereupon the landlord, in a tone of awe and 
wonder, said: “Do you know that you have ridden across the Lake of Constance?” At 
which the rider dropped stone dead at his feet.  
     
In what environment, then, did the behaviour of the stranger take place? The Lake of 
Constance. Certainly [... and it is] interesting for the geographer that this behaviour took 
place in this particular locality. But not for the psychologist as the student of behaviour 
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[… For the latter] will have to say: There is a second sense to the word environment 
according to which our horseman did not ride across the lake at all, but across an ordinary 
snow-swept plain. His behaviour was a riding-over-a-plain, but not a riding-over-a-lake. 
(Koffka 1935, pp. 27f.) 
 
What we experience, according to Gestaltists such as Koffka, are not objects in physical 
reality (objects in the geographic environment). Rather, we experience, precisely, 
Gestalten, created objects, which differ from objects in physical reality inter alia because 
they arise through the application of special Gestalt ‘laws of organization’. 
 
Like their Brentanist predecessors, therefore, the Gestaltists did not conceive the 
psychological environment in realist terms, and they were consequently not able to come 
to a coherent account of the relationship between this environment and the world of 
physical things.(3) Psychologists such as Lewin, Heider and Brunswik, with their theories 
of the ‘psychological environment’, also stopped short of full realism: the psychological 
environment is for them, too, something that is dependent upon the ego, something that is 
present even in dreams.(4)  
    Similar confusions can be found also in the later Husserl, whose Ideas II and Crisis of 
European Sciences otherwise contain a series of masterly descriptions of the features of 
the common-sense world.(5) And the same confusions are present in Scheler, too, whose 
theory of the ‘milieu’ of practical life influenced Heidegger’s writings on ‘being-in-the-
world’:  
   
The “things” which are relevant to our acting, what we always refer to when, for 
example, we trace certain deeds of human beings (or dispositions towards such deeds) to 
their “milieu”, have of course not the slightest to do either with Kant’s “thing in itself” or 
with the objects conceived by science (through the supposition of which science 
“explains” natural facts). The sun of the milieu of human beings is not the sun of 
astronomy. The meat that is stolen, bought, or what have you, is not a sum of cells and 
tissues with the chemicophysical processes which take place within them. The sun of the 
milieu is different at the North Pole, in moderate zones, and at the equator, and its beams 
are felt as different beams. … There is much that “effects” me objectively – for instance, 
electrical and magnetic currents, rays of many sorts that I do not sense, etc., – which 
certainly does not belong to my “milieu” … Only that which I effectively experience 
belongs thereto. (Scheler 1954, p. 158f., Eng. trans., p. 139) 
 
The problem with this passage is clear. As schoolboys with microscopes know, meat that 
is stolen and bought does most certainly possess cells and tissues which undergo 
chemicophysical properties. The sun that is experienced at the North Pole is most 
certainly the same sun as the sun that is experienced at the Equator. It cannot, therefore, 
be the case that the things in our practical, commonsensical environment have ‘not the 
slightest’ to do with the objects conceived by science. But Scheler goes on:  
   
These things are, rather, in some sense intermediate between persons and the reality that 
is studied by physics: The “sun of the milieu” has as little to do with the sun of astronomy 
as it has to do with the “representation” and the “perception of the sun”. A “milieu-thing” 
belongs to an “intermediate realm” lying between our perceptual content and its objects 
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on the one hand and those objectively thought objects on the other. (Scheler 1954, p. 159, 
Eng. trans. p. 140) 
 
1.3 Uexküll’s Constructivist Biology  
Scheler’s talk of intermediate realms recalls the constructivist biology of Jakob von 
Uexküll, of which Scheler was aware. Uexküll, too, embraced an ontology of milieux or 
‘environments’ (Umwelten) as intermediary entities which would somehow exist in a 
realm between the animal and the exterior realm of physics. Every animal, Uexküll held, 
is the creator of its own ‘external reality’, of an Umwelt, that is constructed by the 
organism for its own needs. The ‘first principle of Umwelt theory’ reads as follows :  
   
all animals, from the simplest to the most complex, are fitted into their unique 
worlds with equal completeness. A simple world corresponds to a simple animal, 
a well-articulated world to a complex one. (1957, p. 10) 
 
On the one hand, these created realities are seen as separated off from each other in the 
manner of Leibnizian monads (Uexküll himself refers to them as ‘soap bubbles’(6)). On 
the other hand, however, they are held to be capable of interacting, though the 
explanation we are offered of this interaction is difficult to understand. The eye, we are 
told ‘throws’ the picture that is produced on its retina out of itself into the visual space 
surrounding the animal. ‘If the eye did not have this capacity, the dragonfly would not be 
able to catch a midge in flight. … Sounds, smells, tastes, and touch are all transposed out 
of the body and into the subjective space of the animal’. (Jennings 1909, p. 333)  
Uexküll is reported to have arrived at this doctrine when, on looking up at a beech 
tree in the Heidelberg woods, he came to the realization that:  
   
This is not a beech tree, but rather my beech tree, something that I, with my sensations, 
have constructed in all its details. Everything that I see, hear, smell or feel are not 
qualities that exclusively belong to the beech, but rather are characteristics of my sense 
organs that I project outside of myself. (Schmidt 1980, p. 10, cited in Harrington 1996, p. 
41) 
 
As Uexküll formulated the matter in his Theoretical Biology (1928, p. 2): ‘All reality is 
subjective appearance – this must serve as the fundamental insight of biology, too.’  
    The Kantian flavour of Uexküll’s thinking becomes especially clear in a letter to 
Houston Stewart Chamberlain of 1923 on the opposition between what Uexküll calls the 
‘intuitive space [Anschauungsraum]’ of the animal environment and the ‘space of 
representations’ [Vorstellungsraum] of science. The latter, Uexküll holds, forfeits any 
claim on reality. ‘Intuitive space alone is real.’(7)  
   
We are indeed capable of building a space of representations, in which the suns and stars 
move at incredible distances and in inconceivable time. But this space of representations 
is just a watering-down of our intuitive space, that we gain by allowing several important 
elements of this intuitive space to fall away. …  
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… I am afraid that if I publicly proclaim this perspective, that they will treat me à la 
Galileo, and either lock me up in a madhouse or else ridicule me as an arch-reactionary.  
However I must just once say my piece. Perhaps no one will understand me. 
Nevertheless, it remains a fact: “Eppur non si muove.” I do not move around the sun, but 
rather the sun rises and sets in my arch of the sky. It is always another sun, always a new 
space in which it moves. (Cited in Harrington 1996, pp. 46f. Translation corrected.)  
  
Or in further Kantian vein: ‘Space owes its existence to the inner organization of the 
human subject, who clothes the sense qualities in spatial form.’ (Uexküll 1928, p. 4) Or 
again:  
   
In the eye of the naive person only the one world of appearances is visible, which, 
surrounded by space and time, is full of sounding, smelling, coloured things. Scientific 
research seeks to influence this naive world view from two opposing sides. Physical 
theory seeks to convince the naive person that the world he sees is full of subjective 
illusions, and that the one real world is much poorer, since it consists merely in an 
immense and eternal swirling dance of atoms unfurling itself in purely causal fashion. 
Biological theory, in contrast, seeks to draw to the attention of the naive person the fact 
that he sees much too little, and that the real world is much richer than he suspects 
because there is spread out around every living thing its own world of appearance, which 
is like his world in its basic traits but which nonetheless manifests so many variations that 
he could devote his whole life to the study of these worlds without there ever being an 
end in sight …. And when once we have made a beginning in showing in regard to a few 
animals what environments surround them like solid but invisible glass houses, then we 
will soon be able to people the world around us with numberless other shimmering 
worlds, which will intensify the riches of our world a further thousandfold. In this way 
biology offers to the naive man an unlimited enrichment of his world, while the physicist 
makes of him a beggar. (Uexküll 1928, p. 62) 
 
1.4 Ecological Realism  
The central problem with the work of Scheler, Uexküll and the Gestalists as an account of 
the animal-environment relation is that it seems to rule out the fact of an environment 
common to animals of different species (and thus to render inexplicable the fact of the 
fly’s becoming eaten by the salamander). This problem is close to being resolved in the 
work of Gibson and Barker. Here we have a new phase in the treatment of our problem, a 
phase in which the external environment is at last given its due. To a much greater degree 
than is manifest in even the most radical Gestaltist writings, Gibson and Barker 
emphasize the fact that psychological experience is to be understood not in terms of a 
succession of two-term relations between acts and more or less coherently integrated 
objects in some special “realm”, but rather in terms of a topological nesting, whereby the 
sentient organism is housed or situated within (serves in a certain sense as the interior 
boundary of) a surrounding environment in such a way that its perceptions and actions 
are to be understood theoretically only as occurring within this surrounding framework. 
At the same time the latter is understood not in psychological terms but as something that 
falls squarely within the realm of physics. Moreover, our successive environments are 
seen as containing lakes, chairs, tables, salamanders, sandy beaches, and X-ray 
tomography machines even independently of specific beliefs about these environments 
which we might hold on given occasions.  
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    In both perception and action, from the Gibson-Barker point of view, we are 
embrangled with the very things themselves in the surrounding world, and not, for 
example, with ‘sense data’ or ‘representations’ or ‘noemata’. Perceptions, like actions, 
are achievements of purposeful creatures. Hence perception is not a matter of the 
processing of sensations. Rather it is a direct acquisition of complex information about 
objects in the environment, information which is acquired because the perceiver, in his 
active looking, touching, tasting, feeling, is bound up with those very objects – the 
crumpled shirt, the empty glass, the broken spear – which are relevant to his life and to 
his tasks of the moment.(8)  
    Gibson and Barker, as will become clear, embrace a radically externalistic view of 
mind and action. We have not a Cartesian mind or soul, with its interior theatre of 
‘contents’ or ‘representations’ or ‘beliefs and desires’ and a consequent problem – which 
had plagued the work of Brentano and his first-generation followers – of explaining how 
this mind or soul can succeed, via intentionality, in grasping objects external to itself. 
Rather, we have a perceiving, acting organism, whose perceptions and actions are always 
already inextricably intertwingled with the parts and moments, the things and surfaces, of 
its external environment.  
    Neither Gibson nor Barker, however, were able to attain the sort of ontological 
sophistication in their accounts of this embeddedness-relation of organism and niche that 
we find in the best ontological writings of Brentano, Husserl or Ingarden, and nor did 
they have at their disposal the modern formal-ontological tools which would seem to be 
most appropriate for dealing systematically with holistic phenomena of the sort in 
question. The present essay is thus a first step towards rectifying these inadequacies by 
bringing the ideas of the ecological psychologists into a form where we can apply some 
of the ontological lessons we have learned, above all from recent work on mereology and 
mereotopology in the spirit of Husserl’s third Logical Investigation.(9)  
   
2. A Bicategorial Ontology  
2.1 Continuants and Occurrents  
How are we to do justice ontologically to the fact of complexity? How, more specifically, 
do separate persons, such as you and me, become joined together into social wholes of 
different types – committees, teams, battalions, meetings, conversations, jousts? To 
answer this question we need to distinguish, first of all, two categories of object – 
continuants and occurrents – which serve in a certain sense as the building blocks of 
common-sense reality. Continuants are such as to endure self-identically through time. 
They continue to exist from moment to moment and from day to day. Examples of 
continuants would include, in the first place: you and me, my pet rock, the planet Earth, 
and, from the instant of its formation to the instant it hits the ground: a raindrop. The 
family of continuants thus includes what are called ‘substances’ in the Aristotelian 
terminology (also sometimes called ‘things’ or ‘bodies’ or ‘extended spatial 
magnitudes’). But it includes also entities of other sorts: for instance media (bodies of air 
and water). Occurrents (which include ‘accidents’ in Aristotelian usage , and which 
include also what in more recent terminology are sometimes called events or processes or 
states) occur or happen in time.(10) Examples of occurrents would include: whistles, 
blushes, speakings, runnings, my present headache, your knowledge of French.  
    Continuants take up space and have spatial parts. Occurrents such as blushes, funeral 
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marches, forest fires, too, may be spatially extended, but the spatial extendedness and 
spatial locatedness of occurrents in common-sense reality is in every case parasitic upon 
the extendedness and locatedness of the continuants which are their bearers.  
    A continuant is self-identical from the beginning to the end of its existence. John as 
child is identical to John as adult, even though he may have changed in many ways in the 
intervening years. A continuant accordingly has no temporal parts: the first ten years of 
my life are a part of my life (a large, complex, many-phased occurrent) and not a part of 
me. It is not continuants but occurrents that can have temporal parts: indeed it is as if the 
mode of existing of an occurrent is precisely to unfold itself in time. The parts of an 
occurrent include its successive phases. The parts of a continuant, in contrast, are its arms 
and legs, its organs and cells. In fact, there are a number of deep-rooted analogues 
between the part-whole structures of continuants in space and of occurrents in time.(11) 
Both continuants and occurrents often manifest a many-levelled hierarchical or assembly 
structure: a person is made of atoms which combine together to form cells which 
combine together to form organs which combine together to form the person himself. A 
tennis-match is made of volleys which combine together to form games which combine 
together to form sets which combine together to form the match itself.  
    Where continuants can exist on their own, occurrents require a support from 
continuants in order to exist. The latter are the bearers or carriers of the former. More 
precisely, continuants and occurrents are linked together via the formal tie of specific 
dependence, which is defined as follows:  
   
x is specifically dependent on y =df. (1) x and y share no parts in common, and 
(2) x is necessarily such that it cannot exist unless y exists. 
 
My headache, for example, is specifically dependent on me. An occurrent stands to a 
continuant in the formal tie of one-sided specific dependence only. (Thus it is clear that I 
am not specifically dependent on my headache.) There are also, however, cases where 
objects are bound together via ties of mutual specific dependence; consider for example 
the relation between John the husband and Mary the wife, or between the north and south 
poles of a magnet, or between the pitch, timbre and loudness of a musical tone.(12) 
Equally, there are cases where an object stands in a relation of specific dependence to 
more than one object simultaneously. Thus in particular there are relational occurrents – 
such as kisses and hits, handshakes and conversations – which join one continuant to 
another in more or less enduring fashion. Certain special types of relational occurrents, 
called by Husserl ‘moments of unity’ (1900/01, Eng. trans. p. 442), are responsible for 
uniting together pluralities of separate continuants into single unitary collectives (such as 
flocks of geese or shoals of fish).  
    Continuants and occurrents form two distinct orders of being which have, both 
separately and together, played a predominant role in the history of ontology. Some, such 
as Aristotle and Ingarden, embraced bicategorial ontologies in which a place is found for 
both. More commonly however, as in the case of Mach and Brentano, Whitehead and 
Kotarbiski, monocategorial ontologies were developed in which one or other of the two 
categories was eliminated or reduced in favour of the other. Here, in contrast, we shall 
demonstrate the necessity to develop an ontology in which room is allotted also to objects 
of other types, in addition to continuants, occurrents and their parts and collectives. 
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Above all, we argue, there are social wholes which transcend the boundary between the 
two.  
 
2.2 Complex Occurrents  
Both continuants and occurrents may form collectives. Teams, families, nations are 
examples of collective continuants; meetings, arguments, wars examples of collective 
occurrents. We note in passing that the problem of integrity arises in a different form in 
relation to collective occurrents, since occurrents may form collectives in two-fold 
fashion: via simultaneous compounding, as for example in the case of a musical chord or 
a pattern of colour, and via sequencing in time, as in the case of a melody or film 
sequence.  
    Occurrents can manifest a complex unity of diverse constituents, as is clear already 
from our everyday perceptual experiences. As Ehrenfels points out:  
   
Examples such as the presentation of wetness, in which both the senses of pressure and of 
temperature seem to be equally involved, or those total impressions which we 
imprecisely designate as the tastes of the respective dishes but which clearly involve also 
sensations of pressure, temperature and smell, as well as other, similar examples, indicate 
that if we are to recognize Gestalt qualities at all in these spheres, then, in virtue of the 
high degree of unity of the given presentational complexes, we must also accept the 
possibility of Gestalt qualities comprehending complexes of elements of different 
categories. (Ehrenfels 1890, Eng. trans. p. 97, emphasis added) 
 
Some complex collectives of occurrents (for example a stage performance of a Wagner 
opera) are occurrents which depend on collectives of continuants. The performance of an 
opera is an immensely complex sequence of complex relational occurrents inhering, inter 
alia, in the singers and members of the orchestra as well as in the stage and its props. As 
Ehrenfels also saw, many of the most impressive achievements of human creativity 
consist in finding new ways or patterns in which simple occurrents can become 
compounded together to form complex occurrents – Ehrenfels called them ‘Gestalt 
qualities’ – which are then more than (or different from) the sums of their putative simple 
parts. Complex occurrents such as opera performances enjoy a complexity which 
embraces constituents drawn from widely diverse material domains. Already an act of 
promising manifests a complexity of this sort, embracing constituents of a linguistic, 
psychological, quasi-legal and quasi-ethical sort, as well as more narrowly physical 
constituents of different types (including vibrations in the air and ear and associated 
electrical and chemical events in the brain).  
 
2.3 Complex Continuants  
Non-collective continuants may enjoy a natural integrity, as in the case of animals, 
planets, raindrops. Each of these objects is such as to enjoy a certain completeness or 
rounded-offness, being neither too small nor too large, in contrast both to their 
undetached parts (my arms, your legs) and to arbitrary heaps or aggregates: they have 
complete, connected boundaries and are movable relative to other objects in the world.  
    Continuants may also, however, come to be joined together in such a way as to form 
more or less complex, more or less integrated wholes which are genuine constituents of 
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the furniture of the world. At one extreme we have artefactual assemblies such as 
Meinong’s typewriter or Theseus’s ship.(13) In the middle range we have quasi-unitary 
collectives which fall short of both complete integrity (they are easily decomposed) and 
complete separateness (they are not easily translocated). Examples are: sandy beaches, 
river deltas, clumps of trees, mountain ranges. At the other extreme we have examples of 
the type with which we are here primarily concerned, namely social wholes, a richly 
variegated category which includes not only families and tribes, nations and empires, but 
also orchestras and chess clubs, battalions and football teams, as well as those more or 
less short-lived social groupings which arise when strangers are formally introduced, or 
pair up on the dance floor.(14) These examples inherit some, if not all, of the ontological 
marks of their non-collective counterparts. They can undergo changes through time. They 
have a unity which is something like the unity of a living thing. They have no temporal 
parts (the parts of Poland are Silesia and Galicia, not: Poland under the reign of 
Sigismund III, Poland in the Era of Partition, and so on). They take up space; and as a 
thing may be cleaved into thingly parts, so – as Czechs and Slovaks know – a social 
whole can in certain cases come to be divided into separate sub-collectives. And while 
collective continuants are, like their non-collective counterparts, self-identical from the 
beginning to the end of their existence, this existence, as the examples of Israel and 
Poland show, may be intermittent. And as the case of Austria shows, social wholes may 
be merged for a time into, and subsequently cleaved apart from, other social collectives.  
    Social objects constitute a new dimension of being within the common-sense world, 
analogous to the level of persons proper. Institutions have their own lives, they endure 
through time, despite acquiring or losing members; they have their own qualities and 
states, and their own ways of functioning in collaboration or in interaction with each 
other. And like things on lower levels, they are through and through dependent on 
circumstances and are subject to more and less regular and intelligible patterns of change. 
The Hungarian nobility has existed for many centuries and it will continue to exist for 
some time in the future. Collective continuants are thus to be distinguished from sets, as 
the mathematician conceives them, as also from arbitrary aggregates or pluralities. They 
are examples of unities which are to a degree able to survive changes even in the stock of 
their members or participants.  
 
2.4 Fiat Objects  
Social objects such as juries, courts, contracts, lawsuits are, as judges know, parts of 
reality. But as was stressed by Brentano’s student Anton Marty, they also manifest some 
features which are normally associated with objects in the domain of abstracta or 
irrealia.(15) To be real, according to Marty, is to enter into causal relations. The existence 
in time of a real object typically involves continuous and manifold changes reflecting the 
manifold of causal relations in which it is involved. The existence in time of a social 
collective, in contrast, may for long periods involve no change at all, and even where a 
social collective is subject to change, this will typically consist merely in discrete changes 
(not least the coming into and then going out of existence) as a reflection of certain 
specific changes in the real (including changes in charters, covenants, treaties, contracts 
and the like). This feature of relative isolation from the concrete, causal-energetic sphere 
is manifested by dependent social objects such as claims, obligations, rights, debts, 
knighthoods, relations of ownership and authority, as well as by cultural artefacts such as 
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works of music and literature.  
    Each of the latter is ‘something which, when it comes into existence, is not brought 
about as an effect and when it goes out of existence does not do so directly in 
consequence of the ceasing of an effect.’ (Marty 1908, p. 321) Non-real objects, 
according to Marty, have no history of change in their own right; but nor do they stand 
outside history: the social collective which is the natio hungarica begins to exist with the 
creation of the first Magyar noble and ceases to exist when the last Magyar noble dies. 
The State of Montana begins to exist with a certain declaratory act in Washington in 
1890, and ceases to exist with the dropping on America of the first cyclotromic bomb by 
the Belgian Empire in the year 2084. (One is reminded, here, of Leibniz’s conception of 
aggregates as non-real phaenomena bene fundata which belong neither among the 
substances nor among the accidents.) Social objects have realia as parts, but they are, as it 
were, relatively (causally) isolated from these parts, being affected only by those changes 
in the latter which are such as to bring about the destruction of the collective also.  
    One might now be tempted, with Marty, to impose a two-layer structure on the realm 
of continuants: on the lower layer would be real things, subject to continuous changes 
and causal interactions. On the upper (‘supervenient’) layer would be non-real collectives 
which float, as it were, above the level of the real.(16) The problem with this view is that it 
leaves no room for the interactions between the two levels, for the ways in which our 
thingly, causal-energetic behaviour is constrained – in a manner to be described more 
closely below – through our participation in social collectives and other sorts of 
institutions. Certainly Marty is correct to draw our attention to the fact that many social 
objects are the products of fiat (this is one grain of truth in contractarian doctrines in 
political science as also in accounts of legal and political phenomena based on the theory 
of speech acts(17)). Thus many social objects come into being fully formed as the result of 
legal enactments, of handshakes, of contracts, of affirmations. But how are we to 
reconcile this aspect of objects in the social realm with their capacity to constrain 
behaviour?  
 
2.5 Generic Dependence  
Just as non-collective continuants may gain and lose parts (as Tibbles gains and loses 
molecules), so collective continuants may gain and lose members, and they may undergo 
other sorts of changes through time while still retaining their identity. Towns, cities, 
universities, and corporate bodies generally, manifest the ability to sustain themselves 
through time even though they are subject to a certain turnover of their constituent 
continuants. They can continue to exist even while some of their participants are removed 
and others take their places. In addition there are dependent objects which have 
continuants or collective wholes as their bearers or carriers but which may survive 
replacement of these bearers. Languages, religions, legal systems and many other sorts of 
institutions do not depend for their existence upon specific individuals or groups; rather, 
they depend generically on the existence of individuals or groups fulfilling certain 
necessary roles.  
    To capture the sense in which an institutional object is dependent upon a continuant, 
we need to introduce the notion of generic dependence, which can be defined, in first 
approximation, as follows:  
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x is generically dependent on objects of sort S =df. x is necessarily such that it 
cannot exist unless some object of sort S exists. 
 
A dog owner is in this sense dependent upon a dog; a king is dependent upon his subjects 
– but not on any specific dog, or subjects. A language, religion or legal system is in the 
same sense generically dependent on the individuals and groups who serve, in their 
actions, to instantiate the corresponding rules, beliefs and customs. This sort of generic 
dependence is, as we shall see, characteristic of social objects of many different types.  
   
3. The Ontology of the Common-Sense World  
3.1 The Theory of Physical-Behavioural Units  
Social objects exist in that mesoscopic stratum of reality which we call the common-
sense world. They thus fall outside the purview of physics as narrowly understood. The 
common-sense world is a world in which people work, converse, judge, evaluate; a world 
of animals, tables, clothes, food; of sweet and bitter, red and green, hot and cold. The 
common-sense world is above all a world of things which we put to use for various 
practical purposes, things which exist always in situ, which is to say: in an environment 
of other real things.  
    In addition to things, the common-sense world comprehends also holes, the gaps 
between things, and the media (for example water, smoke) in which things move,(18) as 
well as shadows, rainbows, tides, and similar phenomena. But within this extended array 
of things and media there are also further discriminable areas of organization which 
cross-cut each other on a number of distinct dimensions. The world is organized into 
separate things or bodies, but it is also organized into overlapping social and institutional 
zones or contexts within which human beings figure as participants. It is not as if we have 
persons on one side and thingly contexts on the other, with a gulf between them that is 
bridged via ‘intentionality’. Rather, we can now assert, persons themselves, and things in 
the spatial environment, are both equally caught up within entities of a new, over-arching 
type, which the ecological psychologist Barker calls physical-behavioural units. It is 
these which serve as the successive environments of persons and groups of persons as 
they go about their various activities from day to day.  
    Examples of physical-behavioural units of the type favoured by Barker – who was one 
of Lewin’s first assistants at the Iowa Child Welfare Station – are: Wendy’s Friday 
afternoon class, Jim’s meeting with his teacher, your Thursday lunch, Frank’s early 
morning swim. Such physical-behavioural units may repeat themselves (may exist in 
many copies). They  
   
are common phenomenal entities, and they are natural units in no way imposed by an 
investigator. To laymen they are as objective as rivers and forests – they are parts of the 
objective environment that are experienced directly as rain and sandy beaches are 
experienced. (Barker 1968, p. 11, emphasis added) 
 
Barker insists that physical-behavioural units are parts of reality. They are of inestimable 
importance for an understanding of human cognition and action, since almost all human 
behaviour occurs within one. All roles are played within behaviour settings. All 
organizations are composed of them. All biographies are ordered in terms of them. 
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Human beings are determined through and through by the behaviour settings in which 
they participate, exactly as non-human-animals are determined through and through by 
the ecological niches into which they have evolved. Even our journeys from site to site, 
and our loungings in daydream mode between quests, are recognizable as physical-
behavioural units in Barker’s terms. Even our more or less unsuccessful attempts to 
engage in standard activities can be understand for what they are only in terms of an 
independent prevalence of physical-behavioural units of the corresponding, full-fledged 
type, for it is only in relation to the latter that our attempts are determined as attempts and 
our successes distinguished from our failures. The behaviour settings in which we 
constantly find ourselves are, it must be admitted, to a degree porous, in virtue of the fact 
that we may sometimes switch effective context from moment to moment as our attention 
is distracted now by one thing or person, now by another. This does not, however, detract 
either from their reality or from their salience and their virtual all-pervasiveness in our 
lives as human beings. Only in rare moments of total disorientation do we seem to be set 
free of all behaviour settings, but this is just to imply that it is in relation to settings that 
we are in normal cases oriented.  
 
3.2 Prehistory of Physical-Behavioural Units  
Leaving aside Heidegger, and leaving aside the French existentialists such as Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty (with their work on ‘projects’ and the like, work which was inspired by 
Lewin and other Gestaltists), serious investigations of physical-behavioural units by 
philosophers are almost unknown. Husserl’s theory of the ‘life world’ is a first, informal 
approximation to an ontological theory of the requisite sort. But Husserl, too, stops short 
of any full realist commitment to what he calls the ‘surrounding environment’, and the 
relation of the latter to physical things in space is never clarified.  
    The neglect of physical-behavioural units in the literature of philosophy turns first of 
all on the already mentioned tendency among philosophers to sanction the dominance of 
simplified ontologies, above all ontologies based on continuants or occurrents as sole 
admissible categories, and on their tendency to embrace one or other form of ontological 
monism. For physical-behavioural units, as will by now be clear, are radically 
transcategorial: they transcend the boundary between the two categories of continuant 
and occurrent. And because they can be fitted neatly into neither of the two orders of 
being, they have been neglected in the tradition of ontology. Even those philosophers 
with the ambition to come to grips with the realm of common sense to end up with 
philosophies which reduce this realm – for example on the pattern of the Wittgensteinian 
doctrine of ‘language games’ – to objects of a suitably monistic flavour. In fact, however, 
language, too, is a phenomenon which can be coherently explained only within the 
framework of an ontological theory of physical-behavioural units, since where language 
gets used, under all normal circumstances, such usage is itself such as constitute a 
physical-behavioural unit. To explain human common-sense reality in terms of language 
is to explain the whole in terms of a relatively late-developed part. It is also to forestall 
any mutually beneficial interaction between our understanding of this reality and our 
knowledge of human beings as biological creatures.  
    The neglect of physical-behavioural units turns secondly on the fact that they are 
objects of a holistic nature, of a sort to be treated by instruments such as those of 
mereotopology, and thus they are, again, alien to the world-view of contemporary 
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philosophers who have been inspired by ideas based on predicate logic and set theory as 
instruments of ontology. The formal ontology of settings, niches, or physical behavioural 
units is thus far completely undeveloped, in spite of the degree to which recent work in 
analytic metaphysics has been marked by an increasing readiness to admit into its 
categorial systems objects – such as artefacts, actual and possible worlds, moments, 
tropes and individualized properties – which were for a long time out of favour.  
    But the neglect of physical-behavioural units turns finally on the dominance of 
foundationalist ideas among philosophers through the ages: for physical-behavioural 
units – my evening soup, your Tuesday swim – belong par excellence to the realm of 
mere opinion. Hence, erroneously, it has been concluded either that the given objects are 
not amenable to rigorous treatment, whether philosophical or scientific, or that the given 
objects do not exist (because all ‘opinion’ is false).  
 
3.3 Ontological Properties of Physical-Behavioural Units  
Each physical-behavioural unit has two sorts of components: human beings behaving in 
certain ways (lecturing, sitting, listening, eating), and non-psychological objects with 
which behaviour is transacted (chairs, walls, paper, forks, scalpels, etc.). Each physical-
behavioural unit has a boundary which separates an organized internal (foreground) 
pattern from an external (background) pattern (Husserl’s ‘horizon’). This boundary, too, 
though it is far from simple, is an objective part of nature, though it may change 
according to the participants involved or according to the circumstances from moment to 
moment. Each unit is circumjacent to its components, which means that the former 
surrounds (encloses, encompasses) the latter without a break: the pupils and equipment 
are in the class; the shop opens at 8 a.m. and closes at 6 p.m. The surrounding portion of 
reality is, to be sure, not distinguished physically from its neighbours. The significance of 
this demarcated portion of reality is exclusively psychological in nature (pertains, indeed, 
to the psychology of common sense); but it exists as part of physical reality nonetheless.  
    Units have their own behaviour, and their own laws which govern this behaviour – 
laws which are different from those that govern the behaviour of the persons involved 
(this, too, is a consequence of transcategoriality, and has done much to make physical-
behavioural units resistant to scientific treatment). For Barker, the laws governing such 
units may best be understood in mechanical or at least artefactual terms (terms which will 
recall our discussion of Anton Marty’s theory of collective objects in the foregoing):  
   
The model of an engine seems to be more appropriate to represent what occurs [in the 
realm of physical-behavioural units] than is the model of an organism or person. For 
example, this entity can be ‘turned off’ and disassembled at the will of the operator, the 
chairman. He can adjourn the meeting (for a coffee break) and call it to order again. 
While it is disassembled, some of the parts can be adjusted (a discussant replaced). 
Individuals have no psychological properties like these. (Barker 1978, pp. 34f) 
 
The temporal histories of at least many of the physical-behavioural units by which our 
lives are structured thus have shapes distinct from the temporal histories of individual 
persons and their individual experiences. Physical-behavioural units often have sharp 
beginnings and endings (consider the beginning and ending of a race, or of a contractual 
agreement). Our pains, illnesses, regrets, in contrast, characteristically grow and fade in 
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intensity. Physical-behavioural units and their settings are also sometimes marked by 
spatial borders which are more crisp and more often rectilinear than are the spatial 
borders of naturally occurring phenomena such as epidemics or storms. The borders of 
behaviour settings need not be crisp in other respects, however. (Consider, for example, 
the question whether the groom’s sneezing is or is not a part of that physical-behavioural 
unit which is his wedding.)  
    On the other hand, physical-behavioural units manifest a capacity for self-sustenance 
which is much more like what we find in the biological realm. They are characteristically 
self-regulating, and are such as to guide their components to characteristic states and to 
maintain those states within limited ranges of values in the face of disturbances.(19) Slight 
modifications within given dimensions of the unit can be sustained without detriment to 
its continued existence as a unit of this type. The total behaviour making up the unit – for 
example a Rotary Club meeting – cannot be greatly changed, however, without its being 
destroyed. The meeting must contain an introduction; there must be a speech, there must 
be listening and discussion. Within the meeting, there are the subparts: chairman, 
speaker, discussant, audience (as within the sentence there are the subparts: subject, verb, 
noun, rising inflection, and so on).  
 
3.4 The Systematic Mutual Fittingness of Behaviour and Ecological Setting  
A physical-behavioural unit is a unit: its parts are unified together, but not through any 
similarity or community of substance.  
    The behaviour and the physical objects that together constitute the totality of a given 
physical-behavioural unit are intertwined in such a way as to form a pattern that is by no 
means random: there is a relation of harmonious fit between the standard patterns of 
behaviour occurring within the unit and the pattern of its physical components. (The seats 
in the lecture hall face the speaker. The speaker addresses his remarks out towards the 
audience. The boundary of the football field is, leaving aside certain predetermined 
exceptions, the boundary of the game. The beginning and end of the school music period 
mark the limits of the pattern of music behaviour.) This mutual fittingness of behaviour 
and physical environment extends to the fine, interior structure of behaviour in a way 
which will imply a radical nontransposability of standing patterns of behaviour from one 
environment to another. The physical or historical or ceremonial conditions obtaining in 
particular settings are in addition as essential for some kinds of behaviour as are persons 
with the requisite authority, motives and skills.(20)  
    There are various forces which help to bring about and to sustain this mutual 
fittingness and thus to constitute the unity of the physical-behavioural unit through 
time.(21) Forces which flow in the direction from setting to behaviour include physical 
constraints exercised by hedges, walls or corridors or by persons with sticks; they include 
social forces manifested in the authority of the teacher, in threats, promises, warnings; 
they include the physiological effects of climate, the need for food and water; and they 
include the effects of perceived physiognomic features of the environment (open spaces 
seduce children, a businesslike atmosphere encourages businesslike behaviour). Mutual 
fittingness can be reinforced by learning, and also by a process of selection of the persons 
involved, whether this be one of self-selection (of children who remain in Sunday school 
class in light of their ability to conform to the corresponding standing patterns of 
behaviour), or of externally imposed mental or physical entrance tests. Influences which 
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flow in the contrary direction, which is to say from behaviour to setting, include all those 
ways in which a succession of separate and uncoordinated actions can have unintended 
consequences in the form of new types of actions and new, modified types of settings in 
the future (as the passage of many feet causes pathways to form in the hillside).(22) In the 
case, finally, of physical-behavioural units which involve a multiplicity of persons as 
participants there are influences which flow from the exercise of the controlling power 
which different members exercise to different degrees over the unit’s functioning.  
 
3.5 Hierarchical Nesting  
Many physical-behavioural units occur in assemblies, as a chick embryo, for example, is 
constructed as a nested hierarchy of organs, cells, nuclei, molecules, atoms, and 
subatomic particles. Both the stable patterns of behaviour on the part of the persons 
involved within the unit and the stable patterns of associated physical objects are 
standardly capable of being further divided into sub-units with more or less definite, 
salient boundaries of their own:  
   
A unit in the middle range of a nesting structure is simultaneously both circumjacent and 
interjacent, both whole and part, both entity and environment. An organ – the liver, for 
example – is whole in relation to its own component pattern of cells, and is a part in 
relation to the circumjacent organism that it, with other organs, composes; it forms the 
environment of its cells, and is, itself, environed by the organism. (Barker 1968, p. 154) 
 
There may be many physical-behavioural units of a lower-level kind within a given 
locality, and these are typically embedded within larger units. The drawing of the triangle 
on the blackboard is embedded within the geometry lesson, which is embedded within the 
school, which is embedded within the neighbourhood, and so on.(23)  
    For Gibson, reality in general is a complex hierarchy of inter-nested levels: molecules 
are nested within cells, cells are nested within leaves, leaves are nested within trees, trees 
are nested within forests, and so on.(24) Each type of organism is tuned in its perception 
and actions to objects on a specific level within this complex hierarchy, to objects which 
together form what Gibson calls an ‘ecological niche’. (Gibson’s own account of this 
relationship of tuning – in terms of information pick-up – need not detain us here.) A 
niche is that into which an animal fits; it is that in relation to which the animal is 
habituated in its behaviour.(25) A niche embraces not only things of different sorts, but 
also shapes, textures, tendencies, boundaries (surfaces, edges), all of which are organized 
in such a way as to enjoy affordance-character for the animal in question: they are 
relevant to its survival. The given features motivate the organism; they are such as to 
intrude upon its life, to stimulate the organism in a range of different ways.  
    The perceptions and actions of human beings are likewise tuned to the characteristic 
shapes and qualities and patterns of behaviour of our own respective (mesoscopic) 
environments.(26) This mutual embranglement is however in our case extended further via 
artefacts, and via cultural phenomena such as language and its associated institutions, 
including institutions of law, administration and politics. To learn a language is in part 
also to extend the range of objects in relation to which we are able spontaneously to 
adjust our behaviour and thus to extend radically the types of niche or setting into which 
we can spontaneously fit.  
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    In addition to the nesting of physical-behavioural units we can distinguish also a range 
of cases where behaviour settings influence each other even in the absence of any 
circumjacent higher-level setting within which they would be jointly housed. Thus 
neighbouring countries (especially countries at war, or countries subject to border-
disputes), and competing businesses or street gangs, influence each other mutually. In 
some cases this mutual influence can give rise to, and can be monitored (and influenced 
and to a degree steered from afar) by, new sorts of physical-behavioural units such as 
(sittings of) boundary commissions, trade associations, multinational treaty organizations, 
and the like. Reciprocal co-determination of physical-behavioural units is illustrated also 
in cases where different laboratories across the globe effect a cross-checking of each 
other’s results.(27) Through administrative delegation, through sub-contracting, and 
through the institutions of representative government the scope of effective operation of 
physical-behavioural units can in principle become extended without limit, which is to 
say: extended even far beyond the compass of what can be achieved through the actions 
and perceptions of individuals in direct interaction. As the experience of central planning 
in communist Europe demonstrates, however, there are limits to such extension.(28)  
 
3.6 Transcategoriality and Generic Dependence of Physical-Behavioural Units  
A physical-behavioural unit such as a religious meeting, a tennis championship or a sea 
battle is an intricate complex of times, places, actions, and things. Its constituents can 
include both man-made elements (buildings, streets, cricket fields, books, pianos, 
libraries, the bridges and engine-rooms of battleships) and also natural features (hills, 
lakes, waves, particular climatic features, patterns of light and sound). These features and 
elements may be further restricted to a highly specific combination of, say, a particular 
room in a particular building at a particular time with particular persons and particular 
objects distributed in a particular pattern. In general, however, it is a form of generic 
dependence which prevails in the realm of physical-behavioural units; a judge must hear 
and decide the case, but it need not be this judge; the capital city must be located 
somewhere, but it need not be located in this spot (and in time of war it may be 
relocated).  
    The physical-behavioural unit comprehends things and behaviour, but it may, through 
these, comprehend also a variety of additional, non-physical components. Thus the unit 
may comprehend for example different types of linguistic, legal and institutional 
elements, all combined together in space and time in highly specific ways. The 
phenomena involved are in addition diverse not only as concerns their material 
constitution but also as concerns their ontological form: thus they comprehend 
continuants, events, actions, states and manifold relations between all of these. As Barker 
puts it, echoing earlier remarks by Ehrenfels:(29)  
   
The conceptual incommensurability of phenomena which is such an obstacle to the 
unification of the sciences does not appear to trouble nature’s units. – Within the larger 
units, things and events from conceptually more and more alien sciences are incorporated 
and regulated. (Barker 1968, p. 155) 
 
As far as our behaviour is concerned, therefore, even the most radical diversity of kinds 




3.7 Persons as Social Objects  
The relation between participant and setting is to different degrees one of reciprocal co-
determination. Each participant has two positions within the unit: first, he is a component, 
and thus contributes to forming the unit; second, he is an individual whose behaviour, and 
whose very nature as participant social object, is itself partly formed by the unit of which 
he is at any given moment a part, though not in such a way as to affect his continued 
existence as a human being. Schoggen describes physical-behavioural settings as 
consisting of ‘highly structured, improbable arrangements of objects and events that 
coerce behavior in accordance with their own dynamic patterning.’ (1989, p. 4) The 
person is coloured and shaped, is determined through and through, by the behavioural 
context of the moment. And because this context is subject to change, it follows, as 
Schoggen points out, that  
   
a person has many strengths, many intelligences, many social maturities, many speeds, many 
degrees of liberality and conservativeness, and many moralities, depending in large part on 
the particular contexts of the person’s behavior. For example, the same person who displays 
marked obtusiveness when confronted with a mechanical problem may show impressive skill 
and adroitness in dealing with social situations. (Schoggen 1989, p. 7.) 
 
And as the phenomenologist Aurel Kolnai puts it, a human society  
   
is not only composed of various parts – it is composed of various parts in a multiplicity of 
ways; and consequently its component parts cannot but overlap. In other words, it 
consists ultimately of individuals, but only in the sense that it divides into a multitude of 
individuals across several social subdivisions, such that it comprehends the same 
individual over and over again in line with his various social affiliations, – some of them 
factual, natural and ‘statistical’, some of them largely or wholly a result of voluntary 
choice. (Kolnai 1981, p. 319) 
 
Thus a society is composed of members of the community, of marriage and of the family, 
of the social class, of the union, of the borough, of the state, of the church, etc., and to 
each of these there corresponds in the life of each one of us different zones of salience 
and motivation, different strands of physical-behavioural units in which we are engaged.  
    As (undetached) parts of non-collective continuants (your arm, my leg) have special 
features, so also the participants in collective continuants (actors, admirals, astronomers, 
artists) have certain analogous special features. Human beings serve not as parts of social 
objects (in the unadorned mereological sense of part) but rather, and in virtue of the 
different roles they occupy, as members or elements. We can provide a tentative account 
of these features in terms of Brentano’s account in his Theory of Categories of what he 
called the ‘modal extensions’ of common or garden substances. The latter, Brentano 
claimed, can become transformed in various ways into new types of objects, for example 
through their involvements in occurrents of different types. If John is running then John 
the runner is a (short-lived) modified continuant of this sort. If John is married then John 
the husband is likewise a (typically more enduring) modified continuant of a different 
(institutional) sort. Objects of this sort have been called by Kit Fine (in his 1982) ‘qua 
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objects’ (in reflection of earlier ontologists’ talk of ‘John qua runner’, ‘Bill qua 
President’, ‘Socrates qua philosopher’ and the like).  
    From our present perspective John qua runner is, during the time when he exists, the 
mereological sum of John and the present phase of the occurrent running in which he is 
currently engaged. John qua husband, more complicatedly, is the mereological sum of 
John and some institutional occurrent; but the latter does not exist as separate element, 
tied only to John. Rather it is essentially a part of a much wider institutional whole which 
embraces, inter alia, legal, religious, social, fiscal, and biological elements tied to a 
succession of physical-behavioural units. Husband John, we may say, is the sum of John 
together with some (his) portion of that total institutional bond which (for the time period 
in question) ties him to his wife (and should John and Mary be cast asunder, then John 
the husband and Mary the wife will both, instantaneously, cease to exist).  
 
3.7 From Ecological Psychology to International Law  
Our theory of social objects can now be formulated as follows. There are physical-
behavioural units, standing patterns of behaviour and physical environments, in which we 
are all involved in our daily activities. Such physical-behavioural units are as much a part 
of the furniture of reality as are garden-variety continuants and occurrents (such as you 
and me). This is, if one will, a pre-analytic datum of the theory. Physical-behavioural 
units have parts – including chairman John (at the lecture meeting) and golfer Jim (at the 
links). And they have consequences – including contracts signed, orders issued, 
judgments passed, medals awarded.  
    Some physical-behavioural units form extended chains, repeated instantiations of the 
same or of connected behaviour patterns in historical progression, so that the 
corresponding parts and consequences, too, enjoy a status which appears to transcend any 
particular instantiation. President Bill is President even when he sleeps. The borders of 
Luxemburg remain the borders of Luxemburg even though they are no longer policed or 
fenced.  
    Physical-behavioural units are part of reality: they have physical things and behaviour 
as parts. The physical setting of a physical-behavioural unit (the stock exchange building) 
can still exist even when no pertinent behaviour is occurring; but the unit itself (the stock 
market on each successive trading day) requires pertinent behaviour in order to exist. In 
the realm of animal behaviour, similarly, the setting of a physical-behavioural unit (the 
ecological niche) can still exist even when, because the geese have flown, no pertinent 
behaviour is occurring. But the unit itself (the nesting grounds in the nesting season) 
requires pertinent behaviour in order to exist.  
    To see how this theory would work, let us consider the case of fiat objects in the spatial 
realm, objects which arise as a result of the fact that spatial boundaries come to be drawn, 
for example dividing one parcel of land from another, through acts of human decision or 
fiat.(30) National borders, as well as county- and property-lines, provide examples of fiat 
boundaries in this sense, at least in those cases where, as in the case of Colorado, 
Wyoming or Utah, they lie skew to any qualitative discontinuities on the side of the 
underlying reality. Dade County, Florida, the United States, the Northern Hemisphere, 
etc., are fiat objects of the geographical sort.  
    Such fiat spatial objects, now, are determined through and through by the physical-
behavioral units with which they are associated. A real estate parcel is what and where it 
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is (and is distinct in its nature from any underlying plot of virgin land) because of actions 
of specific sorts that occur in registry offices and as parts of geodetic surveys. A nation is 
what and where it is because of actions of specific sorts that occur in offices of state, in 
high chancelleries and in military outposts. A work of art is what and where it is because 
of actions of specific sorts that occur in offices of art historians, gallery directors and 
curators, and in restoration studios. Each of these processes of authentication can of 
course break down. Thus for example the activities of confidence tricksters in the field of 
real-estate transactions may create fake physical-behavioral units which are, to some 
lucky punters, indistinguishable from the genuine article. Jackson (1990) shows how the 
state system of international law, based on the principle of mutual recognition, may 
operate in such a way as to bestow statehood even upon ‘quasi-states’ whose putative 
governments are entirely lacking in internal control of the relevant territory. And rogue 
gallery directories have in similar fashion in recent decades lent spurious credence to 
whole genres of quasi-art. Once again, however, the very possibility of such breakdown 
presupposes the correct working of the corresponding system of physical-behavioural 
units in the normal case.  
 
4. Is Gibson a Realist?  
The closeness of Gibson’s ecological perspective to the phenomenological theories of the 
life world (or of ‘Umwelt’ or ‘milieu’ or ‘bodily space’) put forward not only by Husserl 
but also by his fellow phenomenologists and by constructivist biologists such as von 
Uexküll might lead us now to call into question the view thus far accepted according to 
which Gibson is to be understood in realist terms. Katz (1987) asks us to consider in this 
light the following characteristic statements from Gibson’s Ecological Approach to 
Visual Perception:  
   
animal and environment make an inseparable pair. Each term implies the other. No 
animal could exist without an environment surrounding it. Equally, although not so 
obvious, an environment implies an animal (or at least an organism) to be surrounded. 
(1979, p. 8)  
The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes, whether for good or ill. – I mean by [affordance] something that refers to both 
the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the 
complementarity of the animal and the environment. (1979, p. 127)  
[A]n affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if 
you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective. – It is both 
physical and psychical, yet neither (1979, p. 129).  
  
These passages dictate, according to Katz, a relativist reading according to which, as 
according to Uexküll, different species live in different worlds:  
   
Do terrestrial animals perceive water correctly and aquatic species incorrectly, or vice 
versa? Gibson as relativist tells us no. Each lives in a different world and, 
complementarily, each perceives differently. Water is a substance in one world and a 
medium in another; it is not absolutely substance, nor is it absolutely medium. ‘The 
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animal and its environment, remember, are reciprocal terms.’ One could never say what 
water is, without saying for whom it is, and conversely. (Katz 1987, p. 120) 
 
There are two principal motivations for relativist and representationalist views of 
cognition: (1) the problem of error, and (2) the problem of seeming global 
incompatibilities between different systems of representations.  
    Perceptual error, according to standard conceptions, reveals that perception cannot be 
solely a product of inputs. It tells us that, on occasion at least, for example in cases of 
hallucination, perceptual objects are created or constituted by the perceiver. The relativist 
holds that the world that is given in perception is always in this sense a constructed or 
constituted world. The relativist is thus able to solve the problem of error without 
abandoning the goal of a unified theory of perception, but only at the heavy price of 
cutting off the roots of his theory in the one, real world that, from the common-sense 
perspective, serves as the environment of perception. The realist solution to the problem 
of error denies that what is phenomenologically experienced as the unitary phenomenon 
of ‘perception’ is in fact a unitary phenomenon at all from the ontological point of view. 
The task of providing a theory of perception (of successful, veridical, world-embrangled 
perception) is then to be distinguished from another, quite different task of giving an 
account of perceptual error (of the different types of shortfall from the standard, veridical 
case).  
    The second motivation for relativism might be formulated as follows: our common-
sense perceptual space has, it seems, a Euclidean structure (or a structure closely related 
thereto); the space of the physicist have another, quite different structure; and it may well 
be that the perceptual spaces of mice, of spiders, of clams, have other structures again. 
Not all of these structures can be true of space as it is in itself. Hence, the argument 
proceeds, our (and the mouse’s and spider’s) perceptual spaces are mere 
‘representations’. It is a constructivist, relativist, projectionist, Kantianist conclusion of 
this sort which Katz attributes to Gibson.  
    But, to remain with Katz’s own preferred example, space (as we may here assume) is a 
continuum. Like all continua it can be partitioned in a range of mutually incompatible 
ways (as a cheese can be sliced in such a way as to produce either triangular or 
rectangular or disk-shaped segments but not all of these at once). All members of a 
family of mutually conflicting ‘perceptual spaces’, now, may very well turn out to be 
compatible after all, if they are interpreted as expressing distinct partitions, for example 
partitions on different levels of granularity, of one and the same reality. The world (like a 
lump of cheese) can be sliced into pieces in more than one way. And one advantage of 
mereology as an instrument of ontology is that it shows us how this is so.  
    Every language, every theory, every system of animal behaviour, generates from this 
perspective its own global partition of reality. The various animal behaviour-systems 
generate corresponding partitions of reality into ecological niches. And human perception 
and action together generate that mesoscopic partition of reality we call the common-
sense world.  
    A science of human environments will look very different from any science of the 
more standard sort. This has led some philosophers and cognitive scientists to suppose 
that environments, settings, physical-behavioural units are ‘phenomena’ only – that they 
are subjective constructs, properly to be treated within the framework of a 
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representationalist or ‘methodologically solipsistic’ psychology. The challenge as Gibson 
saw, is to demonstrate how a science of environmental settings can be ‘consistent with 
physics, mechanics, optics, acoustics, and chemistry’, being only a matter of ‘facts of 
higher order that have never been made explicit by these sciences and have gone 
unrecognized.’ (Gibson 1979, p. 17) To meet this challenge we need to develop a realist 
theory of the physical-behavioural units and of other types of fiat objects relevant to 
everyday human cognition in a manner which does not involve the rejection of standard 
quantitative physics.(31) Gibson uses the term ‘ecology’ precisely in order to designate the 
discipline that should encompass these intermediate-level facts; it is presented as ‘a blend 
of physics, geology, biology, archeology, and anthropology, but with an attempt at 
unification’ on the basis of the question: what can stimulate the organism? (Gibson 1966, 
p. 21)  
    How this is to be done is by now, I hope, clear: physical behavioural units (and their 
animal counterparts), and the social objects which go hand in hand therewith, are parts of 
the spatio-temporal continuum of reality, the same reality that is described by physics. 
They are, from the perspective of physical science, eldritch parts of this reality indeed, 
parts which will never be capable of being understood as the products of any combination 
of physical building-blocks. But they are parts nonetheless.  
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Endnotes  
1. Work on this paper was partly supported by a Research Grant from the National Center 
for Geographic Information and Analysis (Project Varenius, Grant Number SBR 96-
00465). [It has been published in French as  “Les objets sociaux,” Philosophiques, 26/2 
(1999), 315–347; portions of this paper were published in a condensed version as 
“Objects and Their Environments: From Aristotle to Ecological Psychology”, in Andrew 
Frank, Jonathan Raper and Jean-Paul Cheylan (eds.), The Life and Motion of Socio-
Economic Units (GISDATA 8), London: Taylor and Francis, 2001, 79–97.] 
2. Gibson and Koffka were for a time colleagues at Smith, and Gibson’s thesis supervisor 
Herbert S. Langfeld was himself a former student of Stumpf. On the associated 
influences on Gibson see Reed 1989, pp. 19ff., 38, 49f. On Barker and Lewin see 
Schoggen 1989, pp. 300, et passim.  
3. See Mulligan 1995, pp. 189f.  
4. See Heider’s essay on “The Description of the Psychological Environment in the Work 
of Marcel Proust” (1959 85-107), esp. pp. 95f.  
5. See Smith 1995a for an overview of Husserl’s ontology of the common-sense world 
and of its problems.  
6. And also as pipes:  
If one represents the environment of an animal at a given moment as a circle, then one 
can add each successive moment as a new environment-circle. In this way one would 
obtain a pipe which would correspond in its length to the life of the animal. This pipe will 
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be formed on all sides with characters which one can think of as being built up along and 
around the life’s journey of the animal. This life’s journey is thus similar to an 
environment-tunnel that is closed at both ends. The type of character which can appear in 
this environment-tunnel is fixed from the start, so that one can designate its breadth and 
its richness as predestined. But also the temporal length of the tunnel has a predetermined 
extent, which cannot be exceeded. (Uexküll 1928, p .70)  
7. Harrington 1996, p. 46. ‘The world of the physicist counts for the biologist only as a 
conceptual world [nur als eine gedachte Welt], which corresponds to no reality but which 
is to be assessed as an aid valuable for computation.’ (Uexküll 1928, p. 61)  
8. This theory of direct perception has been the target of criticisms from Fodor and 
Pylyshyn (1981) which have done much to ensure that Gibson’s work remains 
unappreciated among philosophers. These criticisms pertain to the question whether 
Gibson’s ecological approach can lead to the discovery of genuine lawful relations in the 
psychological sphere. They do not address aspects of Gibson’s work which are of 
relevance to what is argued here.  
9. See for example Fine 1995, Johansson 1989, Simons 1987, Smith 1996, Varzi 1994.  
10. The most valuable survey of the ontology of continuants and occurrents is to be found 
in Ingarden 1964/65. The terminology is derived from Johnson 1921/24.  
11. These are explored in Zemach 1970.  
12. As Nenon (1997, p. 102) emphasizes, Husserl himself would not run these different 
types of examples together. For him relations like that between husband and wife or 
between a king and his subjects are mere ‘correlative relationships’ governed by analytic 
laws. Zelaniec (1996) shows, however, that it is a far from trivial matter to draw a line 
between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ examples in this sphere. From our present perspective 
all of the given examples form a single continuum. (See also Zelaniec 1992.)  
13. Examples of this sort, treated of in Simons 1987, will here be left aside; their integrity 
can be assumed to rest on simple physical factors such as gluing and nailing, and such 
problems as they raise (pertaining above all to the question of the principle of their 
identity through time) are not here at issue.  
14. See Gilbert 1989, 1993 (especially pp. 122f. of the latter, on ‘plural subjects’).  
15. For a discussion of Marty’s views on collectives and other varieties of non-real 
objects, see Smith 1994, pp. 96ff.  
16. A view along these lines is advanced in Searle 1995 (where the upper level of 
‘institutional facts’ is seen as being constructed and sustained by beliefs, habits and 
customs on the part of those involved). Nenon (1997, p. 102) seems to impute a similar 
two-level view to Husserl, but he here draws inappropriate implications from Husserl’s 
usage of the term ‘abstract’ as synonymous with ‘dependent’ in the third Logical 
Investigation, a usage which has nothing to do with standard interpretations of abstracta 
as entities belonging to special, higher-level realms divorced from the realm of concrete, 
changing, corporeal substances.  
17. Reinach (1913) presents an ‘ontology of social relations’ on this basis which makes 
room in ingenious fashion not only for social-institutional fiats but also for features of 
social reality which are prior to all enactments and to all the positings of the positive law.  
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18. See Fritz Heider, “Thing and Medium” in Heider 1959, 1-35. See also Schoggen 
1989.  
19. Barker 1968, pp. 154f.  
20. Barker 1968, pp. 32.  
21. Barker 1968, pp. 30f.  
22. The global system of pathways across the hillside arises as an unintended 
consequence of many actions carried out on a local scale. Friedrich von Hayek (1979) 
demonstrates the degree to which a range of cultural phenomena, including law, 
language, religion and the market, likewise owe their origin to an unplanned cumulation 
of the effects of individual decisions and actions over time. The ‘Austrian school of 
economics, of which Hayek, along with Carl Menger and Ludwig von Mises, is a leading 
member, seeks quite generally to understand large-scale social phenomena in terms of 
their small-scale constituent parts – or in other words in terms of the behaviour settings in 
which individual participants are involved. On the manifold interconnections between the 
ideas of the Austrian philosophers and those of the Austrian economists, see Grassl and 
Smith (eds.) 1986. The ideas here expounded, on behaviour settings, and on the ‘tuning’ 
of organism to environment, are related also to the economists’ notion of a ‘market 
niche’: see Smith 1986.  
23.  Barker 1968, pp. 11f., 16; 1978, p. 34.  
24. Gibson 1986, p. 101.  
25. Gibson 1986, p. 129.  
26. Scheler, too, saw the need to come to terms with the fact that we are in a certain sense 
tuned to our environment, so that we can pick up information from our surroundings even 
in the absence of conscious, reflective calculation:  
There belongs to the momentary “milieu” not only the series of objects that I perceive … while I 
am walking in the street or sitting in my room, but also everything with whose existence or non-
existence, with whose being so or other than so, I practically “reckon”, e.g. the cars and people 
that I avoid (when I am lost in thought or when my gaze is fix on someone far away). A sailor, for 
example, is able to “reckon” with an oncoming storm from changes in his milieu without being 
able to say which specific change (e.g., in the formation of the clouds, in the temperature, etc.) 
serves as a sign. (Scheler 1954, p. 159, Eng. trans. p. 140) 
27. In Book II of his Ideas Husserl utilizes ideas very much like these in order to provide 
an account of the special environments of, for example, historians, natural scientists, and 
mathematicians. (See Smith 1995a.)  
28. See Steele 1992.  
29. Ehrenfels 1890, English translation p. 110.  
30. See Smith 1995, Smith and Varzi 1997.  
31. This is not to say that phenomenological inquiries should be neglected; rather, these 
too need to be pursued in a way that is consistent with the natural sciences: see Petitot, et 
al. (in press).  
  
